RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAws--JuRsDICTIoN-PoWER OF FEDERAL COURTS T0 INTERPRET
STATE LAWs-A preliminary law question was submitted to the Federal District Court as to whether the operation by the city of Galveston of street lights
was a proprietary or a governmental function-a question of local law. The
Texas Supreme Court had inclined toward the view that it was a proprietary
function,' while the Supreme Court seemed to have held that it was a governmental function,' but neither court had decided the precise point involved. Held:
A Federal District Court considering a local matter not precisely determined by
any decision of the Supreme Court of the state or of the United States, is not
bound to follow the views suggested by either court but may announce its own
view. Rowan v. City of Galveston, 132 Fed. (2d) 257 (S. D. Tex. 1926).
Federal courts, in trials at common law, must administer the laws of the state
when applicable, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution and statutes
of the United States. The Supreme Court early decided that the term "laws"
referred only to statutes and "long established local customs having the force of
In matters of commerce and general jurisprudence the courts of the
laws."
United States administer a peculiar system of non-statutory law sometimes
termed "a federal common law," ' and even in matters of local law, the jurisdiction of Federal courts is independent of and concurrent with that of state courts
In addition, in matters of strictly local law," the Supreme Court has gone so far
as to hold that Federal courts are not bound to follow the decisions of the highest
state courts, where such decisions have not been harmonious or where the latest
decision of the state court was made after the cause of action then before the
8
Federal court had accrued! Whenever this doctrine has been applied-decisions
which were not without strong dissenting opinions '-serious conflicts of law have
'City of Greenville v. Branch, 152 S. W. 478 (Tex. 1912).
'Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U. S. 650 (1921).
'U. S. Rev. Stats. § 721 (1874).
" Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters, i (U. S. 1842).
'See von Moschzisker, The Common Law and Our FederalJurisprudence,74
U. OF PA. L. REV. IO9 (1926).
'Burgess v. Seligman, io7 U. S. 2o (x882) ; Moore-Mansfield Construction
Co. v. Electrical Installation Co., 234 U. S. 619 (914).
E.g. the law of real property, and construction of local legislation.
'Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, i Wall. I75 (U. S. 1863) ; Kuhn v. Fairmount
Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349 (igio). For a full discussion of problem see W. M.
Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State Law, 45 Am. L.
REV. 47 (i9ii), and State Decisions as Precedents in Federal Courts, 58 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 222 (igio).
' See dissenting opinion of Miller, J., in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, supra,
note 8, at page 2o, and that of Holmes, J., in Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co.,
supra, note 8, at page 370.
(75)
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resulted. Since Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co.,"0 this rule has been affirmed at least
once," but in several instances the Supreme Court has refused to apply it to the
case in hand.' The Supreme Court believed that injustice would result were the
decisions of the state courts followed, and yet a situation in which the highest
court of a state is deemed incompetent to declare what is the law of that state
is anomalous indeed. It will be interesting to observe whether the position taken
by the Federal courts will be further strengthened or whether the reasoning of
the dissenting opinions will some day cause a retrenchment.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FLEXIBLE TARIFF-The Tariff Act of 1922, Section
315, provides that the President of the United States shall have power, within
limits, and upon investigation and recommendation by the Tariff Commission,
to increase or decrease rates of duties upon imports. Accordingly, the President
by proclamation advanced the rate of duty upon barium dioxide. As a result,
a test case has been brought on the question of the constitutionality of the above
mentioned section. This case, J. W. Hampton, Jr.and Co. z. United States, was
argued before the United States Court of Customs Appeals on October 6, 1926,
on appeal from the decision of the United States Board of General Appraisers,
now known as the United States Customs Court, reported in U. S. Treas. Dec.

for Apr. 15, 1926 (49 Treas. Dec. 595).

The constitutionality of the "flexible tariff" is as yet a moot point. In the
United States, it is a constitutional maxim that legislative power cannot
be delegated. However, on the ground of necessity, courts have upheld some
such delegations as "not strictly" or "not in any real sense" legislative.
The importers in the instant case argue that the flexible provisions of Section
315 are unconstitutional, contending: (I) that it is an illegal attempt to
delegate legislative and taxing power to the Executive; (2) that the difference
between costs of production at home and abroad is not "a fact" definitely ascertainable, and that therefore the Executive must depend on his judgment in fixing
new rates of duty, thus vitiating the whole plan of the flexible provisions; and
(3) that to levy an avowedly protective tax irrespective of revenue considerations, transcends the power of Congress. Should the importers succeed, the
Tariff Commission will be relegated to its former position of adviser to Congress
in the passage of tariff legislation, and Congress will not have solved the difficulty of enacting a new law every time some provision of the tariff requires
revision. The importance of the instant case, which it is understood will be
carried to the Supreme Court, on the development of executive power under our
tri-partite system of government is obvious. Widespread interest is manifested
in the outcome of the case, especially by importers and students of government.
" Supra, note 8.

'Moore-Mansfield
note 6.

Construction Co. v. Electrical Installation Co., supra,

'Lankford v. Platte Iron Works, 235 U. S. 461 (x915); Edward Hines
Trustees v. Martin, 268 U. S. 458 (1924).
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COUNSEL

FEEs-LiALITY

OF

TRUST FUN--The majority trustees of a

theological school voted to remove it from the present location in Pennsylvania
to Illinois. It was admitted that the proposed removal was bona fide, and would
probably prove advantageous to the school. The minority trustees were successful in restraining any transfer of the property or assets of the school, and in
so doing established the legal rights of the parties. The court below allowed
them counsel fees out of the funds of the school. Held: The funds of the school
are not liable for counsel fees. Hempstead v. Theological School, 286 Pa. 493
(1926).
As a general rule, each party to adversary litigation must pay his own counsel fees.' An exception to the general rule is recognized, when services of
counsel protect or preserve a common fund or common property which is
before the court for administration or distribution
The situation presented
by the facts of this case is a novel one in Pennsylvania, for in all the cases bearing on the point in that jurisdiction, a benefit accrued to the parties interested,
who were either creditors or beneficiaries of a fund designed to reach certain
persons.! In this case, since the fund was not designed to reach certain persons,
no benefit accrued to the interested parties. Counsel attempted to bring the
case under the aforementioned exception, but the court refused to allow counsel
fees from the funds of the school, on the grounds that no fund was before the
court for administration or distribution, and that, as the proposed removal was
bona fide and would have been beneficial, this action was not to protect or preserve a fund. This decision apparently denotes a decided unwillingness on the
part of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to extend the liability of a fund for the
payment of counsel fees. It would seem that the point has not been treated
extensively in other jurisdictions, and whether they will follow the Pennsylvania
decision is problematical. It has been recognized, however, that the bringing of a
fund into court is not the controlling feature in deciding the liability of a fund
for counsel fees.4 Further, it is not unlikely that should similar facts arise,
other courts will interpret "protect or preserve" in a less restricted sense. From
holding the erection of valuable improvements on land, under some circumstances,
to be legal waste,' to holding a successful action, brought to enjoin removal of
the property and assets of a trust fund into another jurisdiction, one to "protect
or preserve" the fund, is not a long step.
1

N. Y. Cent. R. R. v. Bank, i95 Fed. 456 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912); Kelly v.
Benev. Ass'n., 2 Calif. App. 46o, 84 Pac. 321 (i9o5) ; Winton's Appeal, 87 Pa.
77 (1878); Alonso v. Miami, i9 Porto Rico, 32 (913).
'Trustees v. Greenough, 1O5 U. S. 527 (i88) ; Georgia Cent. R. R. v.
Pettus, 113 U. S. 3i6 (i885) ; Davis v. Gemmell, 73 Md. 530, 21 Atl. 712 (189 i );
In re Weed, 163 Pa. 595, 30 Ati. 278 (1894).
'Freeman v. Shreve, 86 Pa. 135 (878) ; In re Perkin's Appeal, io8 Pa. 314
(1885) ; Manderson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 631, 6 AtI. 893 (1886) ; In re Weed, .upra,
note 2.
"Forrester v. B. & M. Co., 29 Mont. 397, 76 Pac. 211 (904).
Cf. Colley
v. Sapp, 44 Okla. 16, 142 Pac. 989 (914) ; Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co. 93
Tenn. 69i, 28 S. W. go (1894).
London v. Greyme, Cro. Jac. I8I (Eng. 16o7) ; Klie v. Van Brock, 56 N. J.
Eq. 18, 37 AtI. 469 (1897). See Melms v. Brewing Co. 104 Wis. 7, 10, 79 N. W.
738, 739 (i08).
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DAMAGES-COSTS OF PRIOR LITIGATION-ATToRNEY'S FEES-The plaintiff
sold short weight cans of salad oil, which he had purchased from a wholesaler,
who in turn had purchased them from the defendant The plaintiff, in reaching
a settlement for an alleged violation of the statute regulating weights in the sale
of foodstuffs, incurred certain expenses, including attorney's fees, for which
he now sues the defendant. Held: The plaintiff could recover his attorney's
fees. Abounader v. Strothmeyer, 217 App. Div. 43, 215 N. Y. Supp. 702 (4 th

Dept. I926). I

The general rule is that where the wrongful acts of the defendant have involved the plaintiff in litigation with others, or placed him in such relation with
others as makes it necessary to incur expenses to protect his interests, such costs
and expenses are recoverable if they are the natural and necessary consequences of
the defendant's act In the principal case since the defendant prepared for sale
and distribution an article which was short weight, the natural consequence of
his act would be that it would ultimately be offered for sale by a retailer, and if
the latter were detected selling the product, he would be accused of statutory
violation. To that extent the principal case falls within the rule allowing
recovery. The cases, however, in applying the general rule indicate a still further
requirement. The plaintiff must prove that the attorney's fees were incurred in
defending what was in fact a breach of contract by the defendant, or a wrongful
act of the defendant, but because of a rule of. law the plaintiff was subjected to
suit therefor.' He must prove that the expenses incurred were reasonable and
that he notified the defendant of the prior suit and thus gave him an opportunity
to enter and conduct the suit.' To illustrate: The Town of W contracted to
have the defendant do certain construction work, and because of the defendant's
negligence was injured. Though W was guilty of no misfeasance, yet by reason
of a rule of law it was liable as a municipality to pedestrians injured by reason
of defective or obstructed streets and so X recovered of W. W later recovered
from the defendant damages which included attorney's fes expended in the prior
suit." But in the case where the A. R. R. wrongfully sold a ticket to M. over
the P. R. R. and on presenting the ticket on"board a P. R. R. train was refused
and ejected, the court held that the P. R. R. could not recover from the A. R. R.
the costs of litigation in a suit by M. against the P. R. R. The reason was that
the ejection of M. was upon the sole responsibility of the P. R. R. and not made
legally necessary by A. R. R.'s wrongful act.! Where then does the principal
case stand? The costs incurred by the plaintiff did not accrue because of the
defendant's act of selling the goods to the wholesaler, but because of the plaintiff's own act of later offering these goods for sale. There is no evidence showing
' For a discussion of the right to recover anything at all in the principal
case, see note in 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 164 (1926).
International State Bank v. Trinidad Elevator Co., 245 Pac. 489 (Colo.
1926) ; Philpot v. Taylor, 75 Ill. 309 (1874) ; Bergquist v. Kreidler, i58 Minn.
127, i96 N. W. 964 (1924).
3
Pa. R. R. v. Wabash R. R., 157 U. S. 225 (1894); McGraw v. Acker, III
Md. 153, 73 AtI. 731 (i9o9) ; Myers v. Adler, i88 Mo. App. 607, 176 S. W. 538

(1915).

' Chase v. Bennett, 59 N. H. 394 (1879).
'Westfield v. Mayo, 122 Mass. ioo (1877).
'Pa. R. R. v. Wabash R. R., supra, note 3.
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that he notified the defendant of the charges against him, and even though he
had, it is not the type of suit that the defendant could take over and defend.
The statute involved in the prior litigation was aimed at the particular act of
the individual accused, and that party's guilt or innocence could not affect the
liability of the manufacturer were he accused. It would seem to follow that the
plaintiff incurred expenses in defending an alleged wrongful act of his own and
hence did not meet the requirement which is established by decided cases. It is
therefore suggested that the plaintiff should not have been allowed to recover
the attorney's fees which he had expended in the prior litigation.

DIVORCE-ALIMONY-EFFECT OF REmARIAGE-The petitioner, by reason of
his former wife's remarriage asks to be relieved of further payment of alimony
to her under a decree granting her a divorce. Held: Order for alimony suspended. Dietrick v. Dietrick, 134 At. 338 (N. J. 1926).
While the question of the effect of a woman's remarriage upon her right
to alimony from her former husband arises for the first time in New Jersey, it
has already been passed upon in a number of other jurisdictions. It has been
held that the subsequent marriage has no effect whatever 1 In another jurisdiction the remarriage, per se, precludes further payment.2 The majority of courts,
however, place the burden of proof on the wife to show that the support afforded
by her second husband is inadequate, in order that the alimony be continued.
The point is a'dvanced that a woman who is receiving alimony voluntarily abandons, by her remarriage, the support awarded by the court for that of her second husband, and for this reason the decree granting the alimony should be
vacated.' By the rationale of the majority of courts, however, the answer would
be this: If the only support a prospective second husband can provide is inadequate a great many possible marriages would never materialize. In order -to
remove so pregnant an obstruction to remarriage the court requires the first
husband to continue the alimony.'
The court in the principal case holds that the wife is entitled to alimony if
she proves that her second husband cannot support her in the same station of life
in which she was maintained by her first husband. The court makes this provision despite the fact that the second husband may well be able to afford her
what is in general adequate support. Certainly in the average case this provision of the New Jersey court does not remove any existing obstacle in the path
of remarriage. For this reason the court in the principal case is not in accord
with the position taken by the great majority of courts in this country.
'Miller v. Clark, 23 Ind. 370 (1864); Shepherd v. Shepherd, I Hun, 24o
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1874). But see Keralfy v. Keralfy, 36 Misc. 4o7, 74 N. Y. Supp.
708 (Sup. Ct. i9oi).
'Baker v. Baker, 4 Ohio App. 17o (915).
"Cohen v. Cohen, i5o Calif. 99, 88 Pac. 267 (i9o6) ; Cole v. Cole, 142 Ill.
19, 31 N. E. 1O9 (1892) ; Southworth v. Treadwell, i68 Mass. 511, 47 N. E. 93
(897).
'Stillman v. Stillman, 99 Ill. i96 (i88i) ; Albee v. Wyman, io Gray, 222
(Mass. 1857).
5
Dietrick v. Dietrick, 134 AUt. at 340 (N. J. 1926).
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DowER-WIFE's

JOINING IN

MORTGAGE-INDUCEMENT

BY

HUSBAND--To

defeat her inchoate right of dower, a husband procured his wife's signature
to a small mortgage on land belonging to him and worth much more than the
mortgage indebtedness, and then refrained from paying off the mortgage. His
agent, with his funds, purchased the land at the foreclosure sale, and conveyed
it without consideration the husband's sister, who held for the benefit of the
husband. The wife brings this suit to force the sister to reconvey the land to
her husband so as to reinstate her inchoate dower. Held: The action is maintainable. Byrnes v. OWens, 243 N. Y. 211, 153 N. E. 51 (1926).
It is a well-settled principle that the inchoate right of dower possesses such
elements of property as to be the subject of judicial protection.1 Once the right
has attached, by reason of the husband's being seised of an inheritable estate
during coverture, a wife may not be deprived of it by fraud.? Courts, including
that of New York, go even further and protect the intended wife before her
inchoate right comes into existence, by setting aside antenuptial conveyances of
property without consideration, made in anticipation of marrage' In most juris-

dictions, where the husband, after marriage, in order to defraud his wife of her
dower, takes title to real estate in a "dummy," equity will look through the
subterfuge and protect the wife.' But in New York, under the interpretation
of its dower statute,' no relief is given to the wife,6 on the strict principle that a
wife has no inchoate right to protect until her'husband is seised "either in fact
or in law" of an inheritable estate. The mere oral agreement or understanding
with the dummy that he will reconvey does not give the necessary seisin--it
merely gives the husband an equitable right to have the property reconveyed to
him.
The dissenting opinion in the principal case is based on the following reasons: (I) There was no claim of fraud in having the wife execute the mortgage
which releases her right if the mortgage is not paid; (2) there was no positive
duty upon the husband to preserve that right by paying the mortgage; (3) by
taking title after the sale in a "dummy," unqer the decisions, the husband was
not seised of an estate of inheritance to which dower could attach. It is sub'Buzick v. Buzick, 44 Iowa, 155 (1884) ; McClurg v. Schwartz, 87 Pa. 521
(1878) ; I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 230.

' Bownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 54 N. E. 251 (1899); Douglas v. Douglas, ii Hun, 4o6 (N. Y. 1877).
'Bookout v. Bookout, 15o Ind. 63, 49 N. E. 824 (1898); Petty v. Petty, 4
B. Mon. 215 (Ky. 1843); Young v. Carter, io Hun, 194 (N. Y. 1877). Cf.
Higgins v. Higgins, 219 Ill. 146, 76 N. E. 89 (i9o5), and comment, 8 VA. L. REv.
52, note 9 (1921).

"Stroup v. Stroup, 140 Ind. 179, 39 N. E. 864 (1894) ; Redmans Admr. v.
Redman, 112 Ky. 76o, 66 S. W. 745 (192o); Crecilius v. Horst, ii Mo. App.

304 (1881).
'N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923), Real Prop. § I9o.
'Phelps v. Phelps, I43 N. Y. 197, 38 N. E. 28o (1894) ; Nicholas v. Park,
78 App. Div. 95, 79 N. Y. Supp. 547 (1st Dept. 1903); Melenky v. Melen, 233
N. Y. 19, 134 N. E. 822 (1922), where the court said "Dower attaches, not to
choses in action, but to estates." See 35 HARv. L. Rv. 206 (1922).
'Melenky v. Melen, supra, note 6, at 22.
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mitted that though the majority opinion leads to what would seem the fairer resuit, and the one that would be obtained in other jurisdictions,8 the dissenting
opinion is the logical one under the New York decisions.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL CONTEMPORANEOUS

AGREEMENT-The

plaintiff occupied a store and a small portion of a basement under a lease from
the defendant. The plaintiff refused to pay the rent on the ground that at the
time the lease was made the defendant made a parol contemporaneous promise,
which induced the plaintiff to sign the agreement, that the partition would be
removed and the plaintiff would be given the entire basement. Plaintiff now
sues to recover property levied upon for the unpaid rent and seeks to introduce the parol agreement. Held: Evidence of the parol agreement is inadmissible. Murphy v. Pinney, 86 Pa. Super. 458 (1926).
The court quotes with approval Giaini v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 32o, 126
Atl. 791 (924), which is the leading Pennsylvania case concerning the application of the parol evidence rule. For an interesting discussion of this subject
see Earl G. Harrison, Pennsylvania Rule as to Admissibility of Evidence to
Establish Contemporaneous Inducing Promises to Affect Written Instruments,
74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 235 (1926). A presentation of certain exceptions to the
parol evidence rule may be found in 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 62 (1926).
EVIDENcE-ADMISSIONS-TEST OF VOLUNTARY CHARAcTER-The accused, a
boy of nineteen, having caused the death of a pedestrian by striking her with an
automobile was arrested and confined to jail without formal charge. On the
coroner's motion the accused was brought to the coroner's inquest where he was
questioned under oath in regard to the homicide. No instruction was given to
him of his privilege to refuse to testify nor was he warned that the testimony
might later be used against him. At the subsequent trial on a charge of involuntary manslaughter the defendant's admissions at the coroner's inquest were
offered in evidence. Held: The evidence is inadmissible. State v. Assenberg,
244 Pac. io27 (Utah, 1926).
If at the time of inquest a person is in custody on suspicion, he cannot
be examined as a mere witness, but only as an accused party in the saine
manner as if brought before a committing magistrate His admissions or confession 2 cannot be used against him on a subsequent trial of an indictmnent
growing out of the inquest unless they have been voluntarily made.! Whether a

'Cf. Gilson v. Hutchinson, i2o Mass.

27

(1876).

'People v. Mondon, io3 N. Y. 211, 8 N. E. 496 (I886).
2
A confession is a species of admission which consists of an express
acknowledgment by the accused in a criminal case of the truth of the guilty
fact charged or an essential part of it. Its admissibility in a criminal case has
an additional limitation to the ordinary requirements of an admission-that it
must have been made without any inducement calculated to destroy its trustworthiness; it must have been made without hope of favor or fear of harm.
2 WIGMORF, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 821, 1050.
3
Maki v. State, I8 Wyo. 481, 112 Pac. 334 (191).
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statement is voluntary depends largely upon the facts of a particular case. The
test of voluntariness laid down by Wigmore is: Was the situation such that the
person had to speak, felt obliged to speak, or was it a matter of pure choice
with him whether to speak or not?' The question then arises how far under
such a canon the fact of arrest or of presence before a coroner's inquest or of
examination on oath or of failure to caution concerning the accused's rights may
prevent the admission from being.in the above sense voluntary; for it may be
argued that any of these circumstances may in a given case make the admission
practically compulsory. A statement is not rendered inadmissible because the
accused was under arrest or in custody at the time," nor by the fact that it was
7
made in answer to a question which assumed his guilt. In the earlier cases,
confessions under oath were generally excluded for the reason that the examination of the prisoner should be without oath.' But this qualification of the accused
was later removed and the rule became that the mere administration of an oath
to the accused will not render the admission involuntary.' Unless otherwise pro0
vided by statute," a statement otherwise voluntary is admissible although it does
the
accused was warned that what he said would be used against
appear
that
not
him, or although it appears that he was not so warned.' But there have been
dicta and opinions expressed to the effect that while the absence of caution does
not affect the voluntary character of an otherwise admissible statement, the
practice ought to prevail that the accused be advised of his legal rights wherever
the conditions are such that it is reasonably certain that he does not himself fully
understand them." From this analysis we find that none of these circumstances
is individually the criterion of whether the statement is voluntary, and yet in
a great number of cases where you find different combinations of these circumstances present the courts have held the statements inadmissible." In the
principal case the accused was a youth who was examined under oath on the

' State

v. Thomas, 25o Mo. 110, 157 S. W. 330 (1913) ; People v. Kennedy,

159 N. Y. 346 (i899).
'2 WIGMORE, op. cit., supra, note 2,4 843.

'Hilburn v. State, 121 Ga. 344, 49 S. E. 318 (904); Commonwealth v.
Corcoran, 182 Mass. 465, 65 N. E. 821 (19o3) ; People v. Wentz, 37 N. Y. 303

(1867).

'Grant v. State, 55 Ala. 2O (1876) ; State v. Blodgett, 50 Or. 329 (1907);
note 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 799.
' Rex v. Haworth, 4 Car. & P. 256 (Eng. 183o) ; Rex v. Tubby, 5 Car. & P.
530 (Eng. 1843).
'United States v. Brown, 4o Fed. 457 (1889); Commonwealth v. Wesley,
I66 Mass. 248, 44 N. E. 228 (1896).

" Under the provisions of the Texas Criminal Code, where the accused is
under arrest, his confession to the officer or to others cannot be used against
him unless he has been first cautioned that they may be used against him. Jackson v. State, 7 Tex. App. 363 (1879); Kennon v. State, ix Tex. App. 356

(1882).

"State v. Hand, 71 N. J. L. 137, 58 Atl. 641 (I9O3) ; People v. Randazzio,
194 N. Y. 147, 87 N. E. 112 (1909) ; Joy, CoNFEssloNS (1842) § 5.
'McNish v. State, 45 Fla. 83, 34 So. 219 (1903) ; State v. Andrews, 35
Or. 388, 58 Pac. 765 (1899) ; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (1912) § 676c.
"Tuttle v. People, 33 Colo. 243, 79 Pac. 1035 (1905); 7o L. R. A. 33,
note.

RECENT CASES
motion of the coroner without being cautioned. If we test these circumstances
by the broad general rule laid down by Wigmore-whether the accused felt
obliged to speak, or if it was a matter of pure choice-we conclude that this
case falls under the former, and hence that the statement was involuntary. How
the court is going to decide the admissibility of a statement in a particular case
then, depends largely on its views on the much disputed question as to how far
a court should go in upholding the constitutional right of the accused against compulsory self-incrimination'

HUSBAND AND WIFF-MARRIED WOMAN'S PROPERTY AcT-WIFE'S LIABILIN JOINT DEo--The defendant, in order to release her
dower, joined in a deed passing her husband's realty. She is now sued for
breach of a covenant against incumbrances contained therein. Held: The defendant is not personally liable notwithstanding the Married Woman's Property Act.' Crain v. Warner, 87 Pa. Super. 605 (1926).
The court refused to take the view that, by releasing her right of dower,
she became a surety for the payment of her husband's debts, but on the contrary held that her common law status remained unchanged. This interpretation is in accord with decisions in other states having Married Woman's
Property Acts of the same general nature,' which leave unaffected the common law freedom from liability of a married woman for the breach of a covenant in the husband's deed. In some states, the statutes, to avoid a possible
misconstruction, expressly provide for the exemption from liability of a married woman in signing away her dower.4 One jurisdiction, however, holds her
liable by reason of her signing a joint deed.' On the other hand, the exemption
from liability at common law for covenants on her own land' was changed by
the modern Married Woman's Property Acts to liability. It is submitted that
ITY FOR COVENANTS

"4Dos Passos, Compulsory Examination of a Defendant Accused of Crime
Both Before and at a Jury Trial, 20 CASE & COMMENT 47 (1914); Knox,
Self-incrimination, 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 139 (1926).
'Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344, which provides that a married woman
may contract as though unmarried, but she may not become an accommodation
endorser, maker, guarantor or surety for another.
'Village of Western Springs v. Collins, 98 Fed. 933 (C. C. A. 7th, Igoo);
Humbird Lumber Co. v. Doran, 24 Idaho, 507, 137 Pac. 66 (I913) ; French v.
Slack, 89 Vt. 514, 96 Atl. 6 (915).
'The common law view is illustrated by the following decisions: Whitbeck
v. Cook, 15 Johns. 482 (N. Y. 1818); Hughes v. Torrence, III Pa. 611, 4 Atl.
825 (1886) ; Semple v. Whorton, 68 Wis. 626, 32 N. W. 68o (1887).
'Stone v. Fry, 191 Mo. App. 607, 178 S. W. 289 (1915) ; Pauley v. Knouse,
lO9 Neb. 716, 192 N. W. 195 (1923); Augusta Bank v. Beard, IOO Va. 687,
42 S. E. 694 (19o2).
'Bolinger v. Brake, 4 Kan. App. i8o, 49 Pac. 950 (1896) ; Fisher v. Clark,
8 Kan. App. 483, 54 Pac. 511 (1898).
'Colcord v. Swan, 7 Mass. 291 (18,'); Wadleigh v. Glines, 6 N. H. 17
(1832); Sawyer v. Little, 4 Vt. 414 (1832).
'Basford v: Pearson, 89 Mass. 504 (1863) ; Real v. Hollister, 17 Neb. 661,
24 N. W. 333 (1885); Sigel v. Johns, 58 Barb. 62o (N. Y. 187o).
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the principal case is justified in theory, since dower is merely an inchoate right;
in the intention of the parties, who never intended to be bound by a covenant;
and in the purpose of the framers of the statute, which never contemplated the
creation of a new liability.

INJUNCTION-PROTECTION

OF

AssOcIATION

NAIE-LACHEs-The Ancient

Arabic Order, Nobles of the Mystic Shrine, brought a bill to enjoin the use
of their emblems and a colorable imitation of their name by the Ancient Egyptian Arabic Order of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine. The complainant association was organized in 1872 to engage in fraternal and charitable work, and
has a present membership of 6oo,ooo. The defendant was organized in 1893
for similar purposes, and has a membership of 9,ooo. Membership in the complainant is strictly limited to whites; the defendant is a colored order. Because of the lapse of over thirty years since the adoption of the defendant's
name, the defendant contends that laches bars the right to an injunction. Held:
The right to an injunction was not barred by laches. Burrell v. MichauX, 286
S. W. 176 (Tex. 1926).
Courts of equity recognize the right of a fraternal association to the
exclusive use of its adopted name, and have, on several occasions, granted injunctions to restrain a colorable imitation thereof by another association
Laches will bar this remedy,' and a leading case held that a delay of twenty
years, coupled with the other circumstances there, constituted laches.' Inasmuch as the lapse of time is much greater in the principal case, the greater part
of the opinion is devoted to reconciling the two decisions. In Creswill v. Grand
Lodge," the defendant, in the time between its organization and the starting of
the action, became a body of 300,000 members and- acquired property of great
value. In view of such a "vast expansion" of the order, the Court held that it
would be inequitable to grant the injunction. In the principal case the court
argues that passage of time alone is not laches, and since there was no such
growth in the defendant order, an injunction would not be inequitable. The
cases contrasted illustrate nicely the criticism made by an eminent text writer
of the theory of laches prevalent in the federal courts.5 The view of laches
generally followed in the state courts is that it is prejudicial delay, and the
theoretical basis for allowing it as a defense is that such delay is unfair, and
'Grand Lodge, K. P. of North and South America v. Grand Lodge, K. P.,
174 Ala. 395, 56 So. 963 (1911) ; Daughters of Isabella v. National Order of

Daughters of Isabella, 83 Conn. 679, 78 Atl. 333 (igio) ; Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks v. Improved Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks,
I2

Tenn. 141, 118 S. W. 389 (19o9).
'Grand Lodge v. Graham, 96 Iowa, 592, 65 N. W. 837, 31 L. R. A. 133

(1896). See Colonial Dames of America v. Colonial Dames of State of New
York, 29 Misc. IO, II, 6o N. Y. Supp. 3o2, 303 (Sup. Ct 1899), aff'd. 63 App.
Div. 61S, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1134 (1901).
'Creswill v. Grand Lodge, 225 U. S. 246

(1912).

4 Ibid.
54 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, (2d ed. I919) § 1444, n. 73.
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impairs the equity of the complainant's bill. The federal courts have based
the doctrine of laches not on the unfairness of the comp!ainant's conduct, but
rather on motives of public policy against the disturbance of possessory titles,
the theory of the statutes of limitations.' This is the doctrine applied in the
two cases. In the Creswill case the wrong of the defendant turned out to be
enormously profitable, and the complainant's delay of twenty years was held a
bar to the injunction. In the principal case the wrong of the defendant brought
it little wealth, so that a delay of thirty years was not fatal to the complainant's bill. The conclusion would appear to be that equity affords more protection to the successful wrongdoer than to the unsuccessful one. Logically,
it seems that they should both receive the same treatment.
Consistent results might be obtained by a limitation of the doctrine of
laches as applied in many trade-mark cases, viz., that as the injunction sought
is in support of a strict legal right, it should not be refused unless the delay
clearly amounted to acquiescence." Whether, however, the rules of trade-mark
cases should apply in these cases between associations not conducted for profit
has been the subject of an interesting difference of opinion. Some decisions
hold that equity should not be so strict in this type of case because no pecuniary
injury is suffered by the complainant? But the court in Burrell v. Michaux
said: "We are of the opinion that the rules should apply to this character of
case with even greater force than in the trade-mark cases. . . . An important
element of the injury in a case like this, if not the greatest element, is an injury
in respect to a matter not of ordinary pecuniary value, but one of first consideration to the complainants, and of incalculable worth as ordinary men
account values." This reason, if accepted, would offer both a logical and desirable solution of the case.

INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF Loss BY HIGHWAY ROBBERY CLAUSE-The
plaintiff was robbed of a diamond pin, which was torn from her waist, while
she was moving through a crowd on board a ship anchored in a harbor. She
felt the pin being removed, but did not see the hand of the thief. Recovery
is sought upon an insurance policy containing a rider protecting against "loss
from highway robbery, by force or violence." The rider also stated: "Mere
disappearance of property from the person of the assured, unless accompanied
by force or violence, and unless also within her knowledge at the time, is not

covered." Held: The plaintiff could not recover. Anderson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 247 Pac. 5o7 (Calif. 1926).
'Hauser v. Foley, i9o Ala. 437, 67 So. 252 (1914) ; Chase v. Chase, 2o R. I.
; Ruckman v. Cox, 63 W. Va. 74, 59 S. E. 76o (19o7).
St., Paul, etc., R. R. v. Sage, 49 Fed. 315, at p. 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1892) ;
Naddo v. Bardon, 5i Fed. 493 (C. C. A. 8th, 1892); Jackson v. Jackson, i75
Fed. 710 (C. C. A. 4 th, 19o9).
' Fullwood v. Fullwood, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 176 (1878) ; Saxlehner v. Eisnor,
179 U. S. 19 (I9OO).
202, 37 Atl. 804 (897)

'Colonial Dames of America v. Colonial Dames of State of New York,
supra, note 2; Most Worshipful Grand Lodge v. Grimshaw, 34 App. D. C.
383 (1910).
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The construction of a "loss by highway robbery" clause in burglary insurance policies has come up only twice' prior to the principal case. In automobile
insurance policies, similar clauses have been held to have a definite meaning
which is obtained from the criminal law While these cases involve statutes,
the problem is not one of statutory but of contract construction.! It is well
settled that it is robbery if the article is so attached to the clothes as to create
resistance." Highway robbery is robbery committed at or near a highway.! A
harbor is such a highway,' and therefore that crime was committed when the
thief took the plaintiff's diamond. It then becomes important to determine
whether highway robbery in the principal case is to be treated differently
because of the rider. The court reasoned that the taking must be with great
force and violence and the assured must be fully aware of the thief's acts.
However, the words "force and violence" merely signify robbery by "hold-up,"
and no particular degree of force is necessary for such robbery. The plaintiff had knowledge of the robbery since she felt the pin being removed. It is
only by means of a narrow construction' of the rider that it can be said that
the assured had to be cognizant of all the robber's acts. This is opposed to the
general rule of construction of insurance policies that, where there are two
possible constructions, both of which are doubtful, the one is adopted which
operates in favor of the assured! The principal case, moreover, in holding the
loss not to be covered by the rider, would appear, as was pointed out by the
dissenting opinion, to ignore the intention of the parties to the contract.
' Duluth Street Ry. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 136 Minn. 299, 16i N. W.
595 (i917), L. R. A. 1917, D, 687, note; Agee v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 253 S. W. 46 (Mo. App., 1923).

'Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wimbish, 12 Ga. App. 712, 78 S. E. 265 (1913);
Michigan Commercial Ins. Co. v. Wills, 57 Ind. App. 256, io6 N. E. 725
(1914); Rush v. Boston Ins. Co., 88 Misc. 48, i5o N. Y. Supp. 457 (Sup. Ct.
1914).

'In the words of Cardozo, J., in Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins.
Co., 239 N. Y. 305, 307, 146 N. E. 432, 433 (1925), 38 A. L. R.

124, note:

"The problem before us is not one of statutory construction. It is one of the
meaning of a contract.

. .

.

Theft under this contract is theft as common

thought and common speech would now image and describe it."
"People v. Campbell, 234 Ill. 391, 84 N. E. 1035 (x9o8), 123 Am. St. Rep.
113, note; 2 BIsHoP, CaIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923), § 1167.

'Duluth Street Ry. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra, note I; State v. Brown,
113 N. C. 645, 18 S. E. 51 (1893).

'Gunter v. Geary, I Calif. 462 (I851); State v. Narrows Island Club,
ioo N. C. 477, 5 S. E. 411 (1888) ; ANGELL, HIGHWAYS (3d ed. 1886) §§ 54, 55.
'Duluth Street Ry. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra, note I; Agee v. Employers' LiabilityAssurance Corp., supra, note I.
'See MACGILLIVRAY, INsURANcE LAw (1912) 964.
'Bankers Mutual Casualty Co. v. State Bank of Goffs, 15o Fed. 78 (C.
C. A. 8th, i9o6); Casner v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., I16 Mo. App. 354,
91 S. W. iool (19o5) ; Duschenes v. Nat. Surety Co., 79 Misc. 332, 139 N. Y.
Supp. 881 (Sup. Ct 1913).
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INTOXICATING

LIQUORS-POSSESSION

FOR

NoN-BEVERAGE

PURPOSES-

PENNSYLVANIA ACT OF 1923-The defendant was indicted for the unlawful
possession of intoxicating liquors under the Pennsylvania Act of 1923,' making
the possession of "intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes" a criminal offense.
The defendant admitted the purchase of the liquor without a physician's pre-

scription, but testified that it was for medicinal purposes only. Held: The defendant was guilty. Commonwealth v. Burdenella, 87 Pa. Super. 594 (1926).
The court's reasoning is that since the defendant admitted the purchase
without a physician's prescription, it was no defense that the possession was
for medicinal purposes only, because the Legislature, when passing this Act,
had in contemplation the National Prohibition Law, and that law states that no
person may lawfully purchase intoxicating liquor for medicinal purposes, exFurther examination of the Pennsylvania
cept on a physician's prescription
Act reveals that it refers only to intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes,
and that no attempt is made to regulate intoxicating liquor to be used for
medicinal purposes. Nor does the Act adopt the provisions of the Volstead
Act, on which the court manifestly based its conclusion, as a part of the independent law of Pennsylvania, except as to the definition of intoxicating liquor.
That the Pennsylvania Act was passed in contemplation of the Federal Act
might not be confuted, but to construe the provisions of the Federal Act as a
part thereof would seem contrary to those general principles of statutory con4
struction, which declare that penal statutes are subject to strict interpretation,
and that they will not be construed to include anything beyond their letter, even
though within their spirit, and nothing can be added to them by inference or
5
Moreover, the decision apparently overlooks the principle that
intendment.
Federal penal laws are not enforceable in the state courts, and that an alleged
offender against the state must be convicted by the state on the basis of its
own independent laws.' There is nothing in the Eighteenth Amendment to the
7
Federal Constitution which destroys this rule. Under a statute similar to that
of Pennsylvania's, Texas is opposed to the principal case. In three cases in
that jurisdiction, on facts almost identical with those of the principal case, it
was held that, under the Texas Penal Code, no person in that state can be
punished for any act or omission unless the same is made penal by the written
8
laws of that state. In Pennsylvania, the offense for which the defendant was
1

Act of 1923, P. L. 34, § 3, Pa. Stat. (Supp. 1924), § 14o98a-3.
*41 Stat. 3o5, Title II, § 6, p. 31o, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1925) § IOI3832 c.
2
Act of 1923, P. L. 34 § 2(a), Pa. Stat. (Supp. 1924) § 14098-a-2(a).
'Warner v. Commonwealth, I Pa. 154 (1845).
5Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 89 At. 968 (1914); Commonwealth
v. Jennings, iog Va. 821, 63 S. E. io8o (igog).
'Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 239 (1828); State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 83 (1844);
United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4 (N. Y. 18ig).
"State v. Gauthier, 121 Me. 522, ri8 Atl. 380 (1922); Commonwealth v.
Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. E. 273 (192o). See BLAKEMORE, PROHIBITION
(1923) 17, 18, 23.
Mayo v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. App. 624, 245 S. W. 249 (1922); Horak v.
State, 95 Tex. Cr. App. 474, 255 S. W. 191 (1923); Fuller v. State, 95 Tex.
Cr. App. 476, 255 S. W. 192 (1923).
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indicted is statutory, and, therefore, it would seem that the same rule should
apply. Finally, as is pointed out by the dissenting justice, the conclusion of
the court operates to render the Act in question unconstitutional. The conclusion is, in effect, that "in any prosecutions under the Act, it is not necessary
for the jury to find that the liquor was possessed for beverage purposes in any
case in which the evidence warrants a finding that the liquor was not purchased
in compliance with the Volstead Act." If this is to be the construction placed
upon the Act, it is submitted that the title 9 does not give a fair indication of
the import of the statute. This is contrary, it seems, to Article III, Section
3, of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873." The case has been appealed to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF OWNER

OF

"DRIVE-IT-YOURSELF"

AUTOMOBILE-

The plaintiff sued the owner of a "drive-it-yourself" automobile to recover
for damages resulting from the negligence of the hirer of the automobile, who
had driven a car only two times previous to the occasion of the accident. This
fact was not known to the defendant. Held: The defendant is not liable.
Saunders Drive-It-Yourself Co. v.Walker, 284 S.W. 1o88 (Ky. C. A. 1926).
It is well settled that the hiring of a vehicle from the owner creates a contract of bailment locati rei,' and that an utomobile not being an inherently
dangerous instrument the bailor of such a vehicle is not responsible to third
persons for its negligent use by the bailee? There is, however, a decided tendency in the recent decisions to hold the owner responsible because of his negligence in entrusting an automobile to a person whom the owner "knows" to be
incompetent.' Incompetency under such circumstances is held to embrace
infancy," intoxication,' lack of skill" or mental incapacity.! The principal case
would seem to lay down a rule of liability dependent not only on facts known t6
the owner but also on facts that from the exercise of ordinary care he should
know. But the court in spite of this apparent requisite of a duty to ascertain
the competency of the hirer, unquestionably, from its discussion and decision,
' The title of the Act is, "An Act Concerning Alcoholic Liquors . . .
Prohibiting the Possession of Intoxicating Liquors for Beverage Purposes."
" "Subject of Bills-Title-No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall
be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in
the title." And it was so held in Commonwealth v. Borough of Dale, 272 Pa.
i8g, 115 Atl. 873 (1922).
12 PARsoNS, CONTRACTS

(9th ed. i9o4) §

200.

2Otoupalik v. Pheps, 73 Colo. 433, 216 Pac. 541 (1923) ; Doersam v. Isen-

burg, 2o5 App. Div. 447, i99 N. Y. Supp. 569 (1923).
3 Gardiner v. Solomon, 2oo Ala. 115, 75 So. 621
(1917) ; Neubrand v. Kraft,
169 Iowa, 444, 151 N. W. 455 (915).
"Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis. 400, I98 N. W. 738 (1924).
'Mitchell v. Churches, II9 Wash. 547, 2o6 Pac. 6 (1922).
'Elliott v. Harding, io7 Ohio, 535, 14o N. E. 338 (1923).
'BERRY,

ed. 1924) §

AUTOMOBILES
2o0.

(5th ed. 1926) § 1511;

HUDDY, AUTOMOBILES

(7th
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fails to adopt it, but rather bases its decision on the lack of actual knowledge
on the part of the owner of the incompetency of tile driver. It is difficult to
see what effort the court could require the owner to expend in order to ascertain the competency of the hirer, if he were not negligent in failing to inquire
of the hirer concerning his previous experience in driving an automobile. It is
submitted that the court in not adopting the broader rule of liability arrived at
a conclusion contrary to the trend of the better modern decisions,' holding that
individual owners oi automobiles have a duty to ascertain the competency of
the owner, and also contrary to a duty consistent with the relation which the
defendant company in the principal case bears to the public. The company was
organized to derive profit from the operation on the public highways of its
tutomobil(s to any one who might apply. It thereby devoted its property to
a public use on public streets for personal gain, charging its business with a
public interest and creating the relation to the public of a public utility' owing
a positive duty to the public to determine the competency of hirers in order
0
not to abuse its use of the streets for its own gain."

PUBLIC SE.RVICE COMMISSIONS-PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC SERVICE ACTAPPOINTMENT-The defendant was appointed by the Governor during a session
of the Senate, to fill a vacancy in the Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania for an unexpired term ending in 1931. The Senate did not act thereon.
After its adjournment, the Governor issued a commission to the defendant to
act until the -nd of the next session of the Senate. The Senate, in an extra
session, calied for the records, and approved the appointment for the unexpired term. Quo warranto proceedings were brought to test defendant's right
to office. ield: The Senate might confirm the appointment for the full unexpired term, and ignore the secondary appointment. Commonwealth v. Stewart,.
286 Pa. 511, 134 At. 392 (1926).
The priacipal case follows and amplifies the ruling laid down by the court
in Commonweallh v. Benn', previously discussed in this REVIEW. In the earlier
case, the court held that the Commission fulfilled a function of the Legislature,
that the latter alone was the appointing power, and that the Governor was its
agent to perforai the duty of appointment. Here it was decided that the Governor
was limited I) the express powers conferred on him by the Public Service Act,"

'Brown v. Green, 6 Boyce (Del.) 449, ioo At. 475 (1917); Anderson v.
Southern Coton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1919); Raub v. Don, 254
Pa. 2o3, 98 Atl. 861 (i916). See Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 37o, 6o So.
150, 153 (1912).
'City of San Antonio v. Besteiro, 209 S. V. 472 (Tex. Civ. App. I919);
POND, PUBLIC UTILITIES (3d ed. 1925) § 705.
"oSee Cit,' of Columbus v. Public Utilities Commission, 1O3 Ohio, 79, 96,
133 N. E. 8oG, 807 (192).
'284 Pa. 121, 131 Ati. 253 (1925).
'See 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 296 (1926).
'Commonwealth v. Benn, supra, note I, at 437, 131 AtI. at 258.
'Act of 1!,13, P. L. 1374, Art. IV, § 2, Pa. Stat. (192o) § 18io6.
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and could not exceed the scope of his agency. Consequently, after his having
made an appoinment in the discharge of his agency, any subsequent attempt
on his part to limit that appointment would be null and void.

WILLS-CoNSTRUcTIO-so-DIsTRIBUTION

PER

STIRPES

OR

PER

CAPITA-In

the second paragraph of his will the testator provided that after the death of
his wife his real estate was to be divided between "my daughter and the two
children of my deceased son share and share alike, the share of the two children
to be placed in bonds." In the third paragraph he provided that "from the
proceeds of my life insurance, I direct that one-half be paid to my daughter,
and the other one-half to be invested in bonds for the use and benefit of the two
children of my deceased son." The testator's daughter claimed that the second
paragraph provided for a per stirpes division, and that therefore she was entitled
to one-half of the real estate. Held: The daughter takes one-third, the division
being per capita. Conn v. Hardin, 284 S. W. 1077 (Ky. 1926).
The principles underlying this decision are in accord with those set forth in
Canfield v. Jamesot, 208 N. W. 369 (Iowa, 1926), discussed in 75 U. OF PA. L.
Rav. 91 (1926).

The decision here reached, however, is different, because in

this will the evidence of an intention to have a per capita division, is not overcome by any indication of a treatment of the two children as a single class. The
testator, moreover, showed in the third clause, where he wanted to achieve the
result of a per stirpes division, that he knew how to do this in unequivocal
language. It is therefore evident that the two cases, different in their decisions,
are clearly distinguishable.

WILLS-CoNSTRUCTION--INTENT OF TESTATOR-By one paragraph of his
will the testator left "all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real and
personal, which I may own at the time of my death, to my wife ...to have

and to hold

. . . in lieu of dower."

By other paragraphs the testator gave

his wife the "power of distributing the estate," according to certain "recommendations." Held: The wife inherited only a life estate with a power of distribution, and not an estate in fee. Livingston v. Ward, 216 App. Div. 675, 216
N. Y. Supp. 37 (Ist Dept. 1926).
In arriving at this conclusion the court applied the cardinal test for the construction of wills, namely, what did the testator intend? 1 This intention must be
sought for in the language used, and, if possible, effect must be given to each and
every word and phrase employed. No words are to be "rejected as meaningless
or repugnant if, by any reasonable construction, they may be made consistent and
significant."' In the principal case, the paragraph which seemed to have the great140 Cyc. 1386.

'Lathrop v. Merrill, 2o7 Mass. 6, 92 N. E. iO9 (191o); Keteltas v.
Keteltas, 72 N. Y. 312 (1878) ; Provenchere's Appeal, 67 Pa. 463 (1871).
'Cardozo, J., in Matter of Buechner, 226 N. Y. 44o, at p. 443, 123 N. E.
741, at p. 742 (1919). Accord: Adams v. Massey, 184 N. Y. 62, 76 N. E. 916
(1go6).
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est influence upon the court's decision was the one set out above which devised
the testator's property to his wife "to have and to hold . . . in lieu of dower."
The testator here used technical terms which are presumed to be used in their
legal sense,4 and, when so employed, they do seem to indicate the testator's intent
to give his wife no more than a life estate. The habendum clause is generally construed as limiting an estate," especially when it is not inconsistent with express
terms granting a greater estate. No such express terms were here present,
and so the habendum clause should be given its usual effect. Furthermore, there
was an absence of words of inheritance which, at common law, were necessary
for the grant of a fee' and which the testator must have had in mind since he
expressly included them in a devise to a friend under a different paragraph of
his will. It is true that by statute ' a fee can be passed without the use of these
words in the grant but only provided an intent to pass a lesser estate does not
appear. The phrase "in lieu of dower" would be contrary to and inconsistent
with a devise of an estate in fee since dower merges in the fee.' A necessary
element of a bequest in lieu of dower is that the widow have her choice between
the specific legacy and her right to dower,' but if the widow here acquired a
fee under the testator's will she would have no option to exercise, the dower
right having merged in the fee.
Subsequent paragraphs of the will are consistent only with this interpretation of the principal clause. In them the testator showed dearly his intention
to deal with an estate which he thought was his even after his wife's life estate
had ceased. He referred to "my estate" and he actually devised it to any surviving children if his wife should not exercise her "power of distributing the
estate" in their favor. In view of the provisions of the will taken as a whole,
it is submitted that the court was correct in finding that the wile inherited only
a life estate with a power of disposition.
'Keteltas v. Keteltas, supra, note 2.
I8 C. J. 331, § 329 and cases there cited.
'Bean v. French, i40 Mass. 229, 3 N. E. 2o6 (1885) ; Jackson v. Davenport,
20 Johns. 536 (N. Y. 1822) ; Lytle v. Lytle, io Watts, 259 (Pa. i84o).
"N. Y. Real Preperty Law, N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (2d ed. 1917) 7445,
§ 245.
'TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 225, and cases there collected.
'Ibid.

